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Questions about the meaning of life are among the deepest and most important questions humans 
can ask. Such questions include: 
 
 Does the universe have any meaning or purpose? (The question of cosmic 
meaning.) 
 Does my life have any meaning or purpose? (The question of individual 
meaning.) 
 If my life does have some meaning or purpose, is that entirely up to me? 
Partially up to me? Or not up to me at all? 
 Could it be—as existential nihilists claim—that life has no meaning 
whatsoever? If so, how should we respond to that complete lack of meaning? 
 If life can have meaning, what forms do such meanings take, which modes of 
meaningfulness are most important, and how can I make my own life as 
meaningful as possible? 
 
These are deep questions because they force us to think about ultimate issues about the nature of 
reality and what our highest priorities in life should be. They are also important questions because 
the quest for meaning is one of the most fundamental and persistent drives in human nature. How 
we answer such questions may determine whether we live lives of happiness and purpose, or 
instead struggle with feelings of apathy, anomie, and despair. 
Over the past three decades, an extensive body of high-quality literature has developed in 
Anglo-American philosophy on the cluster of related issues collectively known as “the meaning 
of life.” One of the most significant participants in that discussion has been the South African 
philosopher, Thaddeus Metz. 
Metz’s Meaning in Life is an important contribution to the growing academic literature on the 
meaning of life. Over the past fifteen years, Metz has published prolifically in the field and is the 
author of a superb Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on the topic. Meaning in Life is 
mostly cobbled together from previously published articles, and shows it in places with certain 
oddities of emphasis and focus. Whatever one thinks about the particular conclusions Metz 
defends, the book unquestionably provides a helpful framework and vocabulary for thinking about 
the relevant issues. 
143  Bassham 
 
 
 
Like most contemporary philosophers who write on the meaning of life, Metz focuses almost 
entirely on questions of individual meaning. Issues of “cosmic” or “holistic” meaning are 
addressed only to the extent that they directly impinge on questions of individual meaning. 
Metz’s book has three main parts. The first part seeks to clarify what we mean when we ask 
about the “meaning” of an individual human life. In Part II, he considers a number of 
supernaturalist theories of meaning, and in Part III he discusses two prominent naturalistic 
accounts of meaning: what he calls subjective naturalism and objective naturalism. He concludes 
with a critique of existential nihilism. 
Metz begins by unpacking the general concept of meaning and setting forth what he believes a 
theory of meaning must include. In his view, meaning is something that comes in degrees, varies 
from person to person, can be manifested in both the parts and in the whole of an individual’s life, 
is intrinsically desirable as an end in itself, is roughly synonymous with terms such as 
“significance” or “importance,” and is exemplified most saliently by certain kinds of intellectual 
excellence (think: Albert Einstein), moral achievement (think: Mother Teresa), and artistic creation 
(think: Pablo Picasso). Meaning should not be confused, he argues, with absurdity, which consists 
in a kind of conspicuous or ludicrous incongruity. Nor should meaning be confused with futility, 
which is roughly the idea of persistent failure to achieve one’s ends (6). 
More debatably, Metz argues that a meaningful life should not be identified with a happy life. 
Metz rightly notes that that there is nothing contradictory in speaking of a “happy but meaningless 
life,” or, conversely, of a “meaningful but unhappy life.” As examples of meaningless but happy 
lives, he cites (a) Nozick’s example of an intensely pleasure-filled life lived inside an experience 
machine1 and (b) Richard Taylor’s example of a drug-fueled Sisyphus joyously (but futilely) 
rolling a rock up a hill for all eternity.2 Plausibly, he takes such examples to show that meaning 
does not consist simply in pleasure or happiness. 
But Metz also argues for a stronger conclusion—that pleasure or happiness as such cannot even 
contribute to a meaningful life (27). As he sees it, a life of Sisyphean rock-rolling, however 
pleasurable or joyous, is a paradigm of absolute meaninglessness. It follows, therefore, that 
pleasure or happiness per se can contribute nothing to a meaningful life. 
This claim is implausible. As Richard Taylor famously argues (but later retracted (Metz 174–
75)), a joyous Sisyphean life of endlessly pointless rock-rolling would not, in fact, be a paradigm 
of complete meaninglessness. Rather, it would possess a kind of “subjective meaning” in virtue of 
the fact that Sisyphus finds it to be deeply meaningful, enjoyable, and fulfilling. Moreover, such a 
life may also possess a kind of objective meaning inasmuch as it involves at least two objective 
and intrinsic goods (happiness and pleasure). If, as many theorists claim, whatever has intrinsic 
value has at least some degree of meaningfulness, then (pace Metz) Sisyphus’s life does have at 
least some meaning, however minimal. 
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As Metz acknowledges, his view of the connection between meaning and happiness seems to 
commit him to the highly implausible claim that Taylor’s classic discussion of the meaning of life 
isn’t about “meaning” at all. Those theorists who speak of empty, objectively insignificant 
pleasures as contributing to meaningfulness are “conceptually confused,” Metz argues (30). In his 
view, nothing that belongs merely to our “animal self” can confer any meaning whatsoever (29–
30). 
What has gone wrong here? The fatal mistake, I suggest, is Metz’s virtual identification of 
“meaning” with the notions of “significance” or “importance” (see, e.g., 79). As Tom Morris 
argues, meaning has to do not only with significance or importance, but also, crucially, with the 
notions of purpose and value.3 Metz focuses unduly on one element of this triad, forcing him to 
draw counterintuitive conclusions at many points in his analysis. 
Having clarified what he takes to be the generic concept of individual (human) life-meaning, 
Metz turns next to consider the leading theories of meaningfulness in the academic literature. His 
principal focus is on the conditions that contribute to what we might term a highly or richly 
meaningful life. He says relatively little—directly at least—about such important issues as: 
a) Are there any human beings that lead (or could lead) completely meaningless lives? If so, 
why? What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a life to have any meaning at all? 
b) Given that some activities (e.g., twiddling your thumbs) can be meaning-neutral, and other 
activities (cf. 64) can be meaning-subtractors (e.g., blowing up the Sphinx just for the fun of it), 
what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for a human life to “meaningful” on balance? 
Metz focuses on three main (families of) theories of what gives meaning to individual human 
lives: supernaturalism (roughly, the view that God, or something spiritual, gives meaning to life), 
subjective naturalism (roughly, the idea that individuals give their own lives meaning through their 
own freely-chosen values and commitments), and objective naturalism (the view that lives have 
meaning to the extent that they connect with important objective values, such as truth , goodness, 
beauty, etc.). (Confusingly, Metz classifies any naturalistic theory that allows for both subjective 
and objective modes of meaningfulness as an “objective” theory. It would be preferable to call 
these “mixed” theories.) Metz ultimately defends a version of objective naturalism. 
Briefly, Metz argues that subjective naturalism is untenable because it implies that utterly 
pointless and insignificant activities like joyous Sisyphean rock-rolling or Nozickian experience-
machine pleasure-surfing would be meaningful, when in fact they are completely devoid of 
meaning. We have seen how this analysis might be challenged. 
Metz turns next to supernaturalist theories of meaning. His rich and complex eighty-page 
discussion of various supernaturalist theories of meaning cannot be summarized adequately here. 
One form of supernaturalism he scrutinizes in detail is what he calls “purpose theory.” According 
to purpose theory, God is absolutely necessary for any form of meaning, and the closer a person 
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comes to fulfilling the (collective or individualized) purpose God has assigned to her, the more 
meaningful her life is. 
Metz offers a mixed bag of objections against supernaturalist accounts of meaning. One 
plausible objection he gives is that, intuitively, some things can be meaningful even if nothing 
supernatural exists (144). For example, feeding a hungry child seems to have significance—and 
therefore meaning—even if we decide that there is no God or spiritual realm. 
Metz’s primary argument against supernaturalism is more questionable. Essentially, he argues 
that supernatural accounts of meaning depend on a conception of God that is ultimately incoherent. 
He argues that meaning can be wholly dependent on God only if God is an absolutely perfect 
being, and God can be an absolutely perfect being only if he is outside of time and completely 
unchangeable. But if God is wholly atemporal and immutable he presumably cannot do things like 
“choose” to create a universe or to “assign” individual life-purposes. Such activities, Metz argues, 
are possible only if God exists in time and can change (106–14). Here four things should be noted: 
 
1. Many contemporary philosophers of religion do not accept the kind of classical 
“perfect being theology” Metz’s argument presupposes. Traditional notions of God 
as immutable, atemporal, and perfectly simple have been widely challenged.4  
2. There are familiar and plausible responses to the sorts of incoherence-arguments 
Metz offers. For example, Thomists would deny that we can speak of God “acting” 
or “choosing” in the same univocal sense that we employ when speaking of human 
agency. Likewise, might not God be wholly immutable and outside time and yet 
able to express his eternal will in ways that have temporal effects? 
3. It is far from clear that the most defensible account of how meaning could be 
entirely dependent on God must presume that God is absolutely perfect. 
4. Nor is it clear that the most defensible supernaturalist account of meaning must 
claim that all possible meaning is totally dependent on God. Why not adopt a mixed 
theory, which claims that some kinds of meanings (e.g., certain kinds of “deep” or 
“ultimate” meanings) are dependent on God, but other sorts of meanings (e.g., 
feeding a hungry child or finding a cure for AIDS) are not (except perhaps in the 
sense that all things are dependent upon God for their existence)? 
In general, Metz’s entire discussion of how meaning(s) might depend upon God could benefit 
from a closer engagement with the (vast) theological literature on notions such as the divine “will” 
or “purpose.” To take but one example: Suppose God’s individualized “purpose” for Smith is that 
he write ten world-class religious novels and save 1,000 lives from a burning building. Smith, alas, 
writes only nine world-class novels and saves only 999 people from the fire (unhappily, one victim 
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jumped to her death). Jones, on the other hand, has a much more limited “purpose” or “assignment” 
from God—namely to produce a single crayon drawing of an angel before tragically dying at age 
three. As Metz describes it, purpose theory seems to imply that Jones led a more meaningful life 
than Smith did, because Jones perfectly fulfilled God’s purpose for his life and Smith did not. A 
brief glance into the theological writings of (say) Aquinas, Molina, or Suarez, would have steered 
Metz into much more plausible waters. 
Having rejected supernaturalist and subjectivist theories of meaning, Metz next turns to 
consider a variety of leading objectivist naturalistic theories. After arguing that all of the most 
widely discussed objectivist theories have fatal weaknesses, Metz lays out and defends what he 
takes to be the correct theory, a view that he calls the “fundamentality view.” The final, heavily 
qualified version of this view (labelled “FT3” in the absurd fashion all-too-common in hyper-
analytic philosophy) is stated as follows: 
 
A human person’s life is more meaningful, the more that she, without violating 
certain moral constraints against degrading sacrifice, employs her reason and in 
ways that either positively orient rationality towards fundamental conditions of 
human existence, or negatively orient it towards what threatens them, such that the 
worse parts of her life cause better parts towards its end by a process that makes for 
a compelling and ideally original life-story; in addition, the meaning in a human 
person’s life is reduced, the more it is negatively oriented towards fundamental 
conditions of human existence or exhibits narrative disvalue. (235) 
 
Or, in a simplified nutshell: Individual lives have meaning to the extent that they positively engage, 
through active uses of reason, with fundamental values such as truth, goodness, and beauty. On 
such an account, a deeply and paradigmatically meaningful life would be one of outstanding moral 
achievement, high-flying intellectual excellence, and significant artistic creation. 
This is a not altogether implausible conception if you accept the network of naturalistic and 
objectivist presuppositions on which it rests. From a theistic view, of course, it is wildly off the 
mark. Metz’s view seems to imply (for example) that babies, the severely mentally challenged, 
and people with Alzheimer’s do not live meaningful lives (or live only minimally meaningful 
lives) because they cannot actively use their reason to perform acts of moral, intellectual, or artistic 
significance. It is true, of course, that they cannot perform such acts in this life. But according to 
classical theism, this life is tiny, infinitesimal fraction of the actual lives of such persons, all of 
whom may be destined to lives of eternal significance, value, and purpose in the hereafter. 
Moreover, according to one widely held version of theism, every human life has meaning—and in 
fact transcendent meaning and value—because all human persons are created in the image of God 
and thereby possess equal inherent worth and dignity. Furthermore, on a theistic view the value or 
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meaning of a human life cannot be measured by actual achievement or worldly “significance” or 
“importance,” for these are all partly matters of luck and all human achievements are smoke and 
“vanity” from what Sidgwick called “the point of view of the universe.”5 The Christian view, 
rather, is that of Milton: “They also serve who only stand and wait.”6 And the Christian view is 
also that of Mother Teresa: Some are called merely “to be faithful.”7 
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